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                                                             Abstract 
 
 
In order to qualify economic growth as “pro-poor”, at least per capita income-growth rates of 
the poor should be larger than the corresponding growth-rates of the non-poor resulting in a 
lower degree of distributional inequality. Measured in this sense, economic growth in South-
Eastern Europe during the last 10-15 years was not pro-poor but pro-rich. Future growth can 
be changed towards the “pro-poor”-goal through a strategy with two “legs”: Stimulation of 
overall growth and specific programs to make economic growth “pro-poor”. Overall growth 
can be stimulated by good governance, macro-economic stability and the establishment of 
competitive markets. Specific programs should be focussed on sectors the poor work in 
(mainly agriculture), on regions the poor live in (mainly rural areas) and on the demand for 
factors the poor possess or are able to possess (labour). The paper discusses some elements of 
rural development, the possibilities of stimulating the demand for labour, and the necessary 
steps to improve the access of the poor to education and health-services. In addition to that, 
the problems of “pockets of poverty” are being discussed. A consistent strategy like this 
requires political decisiveness and administrative competence. It is hard to imagine that it can 
be materialized without giving the poor “voice” to influence the institutions and policies that 






   2
 
1.   Some conceptual issues and empirical results 
 
The term “pro-poor growth” has been frequently used in official documents of national 
governments and international organisations. But its meaning is far from being clear. I don’t 
want to discuss here all conceptual issues
1. But some remarks about the relevant concepts are 
unavoidable.  
 
In the context of “pro-poor growth”, poverty usually means “income-poverty”, measured by 
the headcount index or the povertygap (the percentage of total population living below a 
certain poverty line and the aggregate distance of the poor’s income from this line 
respectively). Measured in this way, the degree of income-poverty essentially depends on the 
location of the poverty line, or in other words: on the definition of the minimum income (or 
consumption) for a household or an individual not to be considered as poor. An 
internationally widely utilized poverty line is 1 US-$ a day per capita measured in purchasing 
power parity. Corresponding to this line, 2 % of Albania’s total population have been poor in 
2002 – following the country’s Millenium Development Goal-Profile.
2  The World Bank’s 
poverty assessment on the same country choose a different definition. People are considered 
poor if they earn less than 4 891 Leks per month (which is a bit more than 1 US-$ a day per 
capita). Measured against this limit, 25 % of total population have been considered poor in 
2002.
3 Obviously the definition of the poverty line – and, of course, the sophistication of the 
underlying statistical procedure – is crucial for measuring income-poverty.  
 
Another point should warn us of uncritically interpreting the commonly used indicators. 
Neither the headcount index nor the poverty-gap says anything about the income distribution 
below or above the poverty-line. The poor’s income may be concentrated just below the line 
or alternatively their income may be widely spread. In the first case – illustrated by Croatia
4 -
overall economic growth will reduce measured poverty much more than in the second case. 
On the other hand, if incomes of a large part of the non-poor are concentrated just above the 
poverty-line, an economic recession may considerably increase poverty which is less probable 
if incomes of the non-poor are widely spread. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a country in case. A 
                                                 
1 Lopez (2004) gives an introduction into the definitional debate. 
2 World Bank (2004d). 
3 World Bank (2003a), p. XII.  
4 Poverty in this country is „shallow”. On average the consumption of a poor household is 20,7 % below poverty 
line. See World Bank (2001), p. VII.   3
large part of the non-poor earn incomes close to the poverty line which makes them very 
vulnerable to any economic downswing
5.  
 
Let me mention another point. Non-income indicators may give us a more realistic picture of 
poverty than income indicators do. Such indicators for example refer to the educational level 
of individuals, the housing conditions, the access to health services etc. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina 27 % of adults can be considered “education poor” in the sense of not having 
finished primary education, and 29 % can be called “rights-poor”, defined as belonging to 
households without established property rights for their housing
6  These are aspects of poverty 
which cannot be indicated by the income-concept. 
 
Nevertheless, there is a positive correlation between changes in income- and non-income 
indicators of poverty. In general, any increase in overall income will improve the educational 
level of people, their state of health etc. because individuals can spend more for these 
purposes and/or because governments can afford more of social expenditures. The case, 
however, of the “rights-poor” in Bosnia-Herzegovina indicates, that certain aspects of poverty 
could be eliminated even without economic growth.     
 
Income-poverty could not. Its decrease crucially depends on the overall economic growth. 
How strongly must poverty decrease in order to qualify economic growth as a “pro-poor” 
process? It does not make sense to apply the term to any process which mitigates poverty 
even in the slightest way. At least per capita-income growth rates of the poor should be 
larger than per capita income growth-rates of the non-poor, resulting in a lower degree of 
distributional inequality. This is no definition which complies with all requirements which 
can be formulated from a theoretical point of view
7, but it can serve as some kind of “thumb 
rule”.  
 
One should distinguish this concept from another one: the elasticity of poverty to growth, 
i.e. the percent change of the poverty rate divided by the percent change in the growth rate. 
An elasticity of 2 means that one percent point more GDP-growth (per capita) will reduce the 
headcount index by 2 percent points. It has been shown that this elasticity varies with the 
degree of initial inequality of income- and asset-distribution. The more equal income and 
                                                 
5 World Bank (2003b), p. II.  
6 Op. cit.  
7 Klasen, 2003, p. 3 f. formulates some theoretical requirements.   4
assets have been distributed initially, the higher the poverty-reducing effect of growth. This 
dependency in mind, Ravallion  (2000, p. 17) suggested an “elasticity of poverty to the 
distribution-corrected rate of growth” which gives the following formula: 
                                                    r = b(1-G)g 
“r” being the annual percent change in the proportion of the population living in poverty, “g” 
being the growth rate of average income per capita, “G” being the Gini-Coefficient of income 
distribution and “b” the elasticity of poverty to the distribution-corrected rate of growth. Its 
estimated value is -4 (Ravallion, 2000, p. 18). The higher the Gini, the lower the poverty-
reducing impact of a given growth rate. To take an example: The Gini for the Albanian 
income distribution has been estimated as 0,58
8, which is quite high. Given an annual growth 
rate of income per capita of 2 %, the Headcount Index will decrease by 3 percent points.  In 
case of a more equal income distribution (say G=0,25), the poverty-reducing impact of the 
given growth-rate would be higher (6 percent points).   
 
This, of course, is a mechanistic way of looking at the relationship between poverty-reduction 
and income-growth. It does not say anything about the underlying causalities and it does not 
allow qualifying a growth-process as “pro-poor” in the above mentioned sense. Nevertheless, 
the calculation of a poverty-elasticity of growth points to an important fact: it is initial 
inequality which determines the impact of growth on poverty
9.  
 
Having discussed some conceptual issues and measurement possibilities the question arises: 
Can past economic growth in South-East Europe be qualified as “pro-poor”? In order to 
answer this question, one should calculate income-growth-rates of different brackets of the 
distributional pyramid and the corresponding changes of distributional patterns in all countries 
of the region. This is a big task, sufficient for a special research project. I must restrict myself 
to a more modest approach. As we have seen, growth may be qualified as “pro-poor” if in the 
course of growth income distribution becomes more equal implying larger growth-rates of the 
income per capita of the poor than for the non-poor. 
 
There is no empirical evidence that income distribution has become more equal in South-
Eastern-Europe. On the contrary! As far as comparable Gini-coefficients show, inequality has 
increased as a consequence of the transformation process (see table 1 with data for Bulgaria 
                                                 
8 World Bank (2003a), p. 33. 
9 The author discussed the relationship between equality and growth in Sautter (2002).   5
and Romania)
10. For some years this process was characterized by negative growth rates. So 
there was no growth at all, even less a “pro-poor”-growth. Later on macroeconomic 
development recovered, in some countries in a remarkable way (figure 1). But even then the 
poor at best participated proportionately from growth, not to a disproportionate higher extent; 
there are no signs of a substantially decreasing inequality. In some cases (i.e. Romania in 
2000-2002) episodes of high growth rates can also be characterized as periods of deteriorating 
equality which hampered the impact of growth on poverty.
11 All empirical evidence suggests: 
Economic growth in South-Eastern  Europe during the last 10-15 years was not pro-poor, 
it rather was pro-rich. The poor benefited less from growth than the well-to-do. In most 
countries, poverty-rates increased and even where they recently declined, this reduction as a 
very modest one
12. The question suggests itself: How can growth in the future made pro-poor? 
What are the elements of a strategy oriented to this aim?   
 
2.  Elements of a strategy for pro-poor growth. 
 
“Pro-poor”-growth is first of all “growth”. Economic activities in general should expand, 
overall income should increase. The first question, therefore, refers to the determinants of 
overall economic growth which can be influenced politically. Some of these determinants 
are neutral in terms of poverty-reduction or may even improve directly the opportunities of 
the poor to participate in economic growth. Some others may temporarily conflict with the 
goal of poverty alleviation. For example, a cut of public spending may be necessary in order 
to combat inflation as a prerequisite for sustainable growth. This can hurt the poor if the cut, 
for example, includes food subsidies. The same may be true for an exchange-rate devaluation. 
It stimulates export activities and growth but possibly increases food prices. The following 
discussion is focussed on “win-win”-constellations as there is large scope for corresponding 
measures. “Trade-off”-constellations between growth-stimulation and poverty-reduction in 
the short run will be discussed only cursorily
13.  
 
                                                 
10 For other countries, there are no comparable data that could indicate the change of distribution in the course of 
time. But it can be assumed, that their distributional pattern showed a similar development.  
11 Romania’s GDP growth of 5.3 percent in 2001 was one of the highest in Europe, but income distribution 
moved adversely for the poor, World Bank (2003d), p. 25.  
12 Headcount indices are just one indicator of poverty. Mitev/Stubbs (2004) give some information on social 
indicators.  
13 Literature on pro-poor growth shows, that there exist various trade-off situations, see Lopez (2004).    6
But the growth-process may only be called “pro-poor” if it is focussed on sectors the poor 
work in, on regions the poor live in and if it increases disproportionately the demand for 
factors the poor possess or are able to possess. The second question, therefore, refers to the 
possibilities to stimulate (a) the sectoral and regional growth, (b) the demand for labour (as 
the factor which can be supplied by the poor) and (c) the education as well as the state of 
health of the poor.  
 
I’ll not discuss social policy issues as they are the topic of another session. It is self-evident 
that economic growth also improves the possibilities for public welfare programs. One may 
call them the indirect way to make the growth-process “pro-poor”. I’ll concentrate on the 
direct way, the disproportionate increase of production in sectors and regions the poor live in 
and the disproportionate increase of demand for factors the poor possess or are able to 
possess. The framework for this pro-poor growth is the stimulation of overall growth.  
 
2.1. The stimulation of overall economic growth.    
 
Theoretical knowledge as well as empirical evidence show us that overall economic growth 
can be stimulated through 
a) Good governance, 




ad a) Good governance. -  Time is over in which international organizations, inspired by a 
very narrow interpretation of the so called “Washington consensus” (Williamson, 1990), 
propagated some kind of “minimal state”: as little government as possible. The new 
consensus is a “strong but limited state” (World Bank, 1997). “Strong” means: decisiveness 
of politicians in preparing and executing reforms, a transparent political decision-making 
process, an efficient public administration free of corruption, a sufficient independency of 
governmental authorities from private interest groups. That states have to be “limited” means: 
the executive is being efficiently controlled by the legislature, the “rule of law” governs 
politics, the government refrains itself from distorting market interventions. Following vast 
                                                 
14 An overview on the institutional requisites for economic development gives Sautter (2004, pp. 290-308).   7




The legacy of the region is a different one and it would be unrealistic to expect that 10 or 15 
years are sufficient to transform it completely (by the way: Meanwhile Germans think that it 
takes at least one generation to overcome their internal East-West-gap.) One has to be patient. 
However, it seems that some countries have been too patient. Their transformation- process 
has been delayed for several years (in Bulgaria reforms began only in 1997
16), it was executed 
in a “stop and go”-manner (i.e. in Moldova and Romania
17), it was severely obstructed by 
internal conflicts (i.e. in Serbia-Montenegro and Croatia
18) and it has still to wrestle with 
unsolved problems of political identity (i.e. in Bosnia-Herzegovina
19). The best one can say is 
that transformation has begun. It is a big challenge to continue it without further delay. There 
are numerous tasks which should be tackled. The following list is far from being complete: 
 
-  The administrative fragmentation of the country which impedes a free circulation of 
persons, goods and services has to be overcome  (the special problem of Bosnia-
Herzegovina
20);  
-  the civil service should become more merit-based and de-politicised; 
-  the public expenditure management as well as the tax administration are highly 
inefficient and should be modernized; 
-  human rights as well as private property rights must be protected much more 
consequently (which does not mean, that the progress reached until now should be 
neglected; see table 2); 
-  peace-keeping institutions and police forces are challenged by post-conflict risks (i.e. 
minefields), by violence and criminality (one of the big problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina); 
-  the legal problems of refugees, internally displaced people and asylum seekers have to 
be solved
21; 
-  a fundamental reform of the judicial system should facilitate the “rule of law”; 
                                                 
15 World Bank (1997, 2000b); Leftwich (1994); Bardhan (1990); Alesina/Perotti (1994); Weder (1999). Khan 
(2002) gives  empirical evidence on the importance of political stability and continuity in economic reforms and 
policies comparing Malaysia with Pakistan.    
16 World Bank (2004a), p. 1. 
17 International Monetary Fund and International Development Association (2002); World Bank (2003c, 2004c).  
18 World Bank (2000a), Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2001). 
19 World Bank (2003b). 
20 World Bank (2003b). 
21 Their number has been estimated to 470 000 and 660 000 for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro and 
this amounts to 11.5% and 8.1% of total population respectively; Mitev/Stubbs (2004), p. 64.     8
-  the fight against corruption as one of the main problems in all countries is imperative. In 
many statements of potential investors the widespread corruption is mentioned as one of 
the most severe obstacles for doing business in South-Eastern Europe. In the list of 
“Transparency International” in which countries are ordered corresponding to their 
“Corruption Perception Index”, the best rank of all South-European countries has Bulgaria 
(rank 55) and the worst one has Serbia-Montenegro (rank 109 out of 133 places, see table 
3). 
 
Steps in these directions are not only necessary for stimulating overall growth. They are also 
an indispensable element of a pro-poor growth-strategy. The poor are most hit by an non-
transparent and corruptive administration, by violation of human rights, by the non-existence 
of an impartial judiciary etc. What is necessary, therefore, for stimulating growth in general is 
also necessary for any fight against poverty and vice versa. An effective protection of human 
rights, a corruption-free administration and functioning democratic institutions give the poor 
“voice” to influence policies. Without this “empowerment” of the poor, any strategy to 
improve their situation will fail.   
 
ad b) Macro-economic stability. - One of the undisputable lections of the past economic 
performance of many developing countries is, that macroeconomic stability is a precondition 
of growth. Permanent high inflation rates divert economic activities from productive targets to 
more speculative ones, they undermine the capital market and distort factor allocation, they 
falsify price-signals and sooner or later they end in an economic breakdown. Therefore, 
sustainable growth of real incomes is not possible in an inflationary environment
22. What is 
even more important in the context of pro-poor growth: The poor are disproportionately hit by 
rising prices (Romer/Romer, 1998). They cannot protect themselves through sophisticated 
money-market instruments and their market-power is too weak to compensate higher 
consumer-prices by higher factor-incomes. When an inflationary process finally ends in an 
economic breakdown, they suffer most of all. Macroeconomic stability, therefore, is a central 
element of a strategy for pro-poor growth
23.  
 
Another lection from past experience is that unsustainable fiscal deficits are one of the main 
causes of inflations. Confronted with a weak tax-basis and aggravated by poor tax 
administrations, governments often take refuge in an “inflation tax” as an easy way to get 
                                                 
22 This is one of the results of various empirical studies on pro-poor-growth, see Lopez (2004), p. 15. 
23 Dollar/Kraay (2000). Following these authors, monetary stabilization is a “super pro-poor”-policy (op.cit.p.5).   9
revenues. Other sources of government-induced inflations are deficits of State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) and their compensation under the regime of a “soft budget constraint”. 
These are typical features of a “weak but over-extended state” in contrast to the desirable 
“strong but limited state”.      
 
What all countries in the region inherited from the past was exactly this caricature of a polity. 
They still struggle to transform it and to harden the budget constraint – not without some 
success. In all countries the very high inflation which characterized the early years of 
transformation came to an end. In Croatia i.e. the annual price increase in 1993 was about 
1300 percent. At present it is between 1 and 2 percent. Bulgaria, which started its 
transformation in 1997 with a 1000 percent inflation-rate, has achieved monetary stability. So 
in most countries macro-economic stabilization is a success story (table 4 and figure 2).   
 
The most effective instrument was a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor of domestic 
money supply. Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina even established a currency board which is 
an extreme form of monetary self-binding
24. Under this regime the Central Bank can no 
longer monetarize fiscal or quasi-fiscal deficits but it also looses its capacity to compensate 
internal or external shocks. Starting from high inflation rates, the nominal-anchor approach 
may be the only way to establish a “stabilization-culture” and to create confidence into the 
authorities of monetary policy.   
 
However, it is a very risky approach
25. The example of Argentina should warn us. For 10 
years its currency board worked quite well and its creator Cavallo even tried to export it to 
other countries as the “Argentinian model”. Meanwhile nobody would try to imitate the 
example of this country. What went wrong? It was not possible to control all fiscal and quasi-
fiscal deficits. Prices for non-tradable goods increased, resulting in an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate and subsequently in growing deficits in the current account. When external 
creditors lost their confidence into the system, it broke down with severe consequences for the 
whole economy (Stukenbrock, 2004, p. 80-94).  
 
Countries in South-Eastern Europe are not immune to these risks. Budgetary processes still 
are not very transparent and rational. Tax evasion is wide spread. The temptation to take 
refuge in an inflation tax is still present. Moreover, in some countries SOEs continue to 
                                                 
24 World Bank (2004a), p. 2; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council of Ministers BIH (2003), p. 12. 
25 The risks are discussed in Stukenbrock (2004).   10
produce high deficits. Macro-economic stability, therefore, is not guaranteed. To maintain it 
may be even more difficult than it was to gain it (this is also the experience of many 
developing countries). 
 
The challenge is to get a “soft landing” from a nominal anchor-system which does not allow 
any flexibility in dealing with shocks to a more flexible regime without losing the confidence 
into monetary stability which was gained under the old system. It seems necessary in this 
context to take the following steps – irrespective of the existence or non-existence of a 
currency board:  
 
-  build a robust and effective public sector management system which provides for high 
levels of fiscal control and strategic budget prioritization; 
-  harden the budget-constraint with regard to SOEs; 
-  reform the tax system (i.e. with a shift of tax burden from payroll-taxes with its 
detrimental effect on employment to indirect taxes); 
-  strengthen the tax authority in order to eliminate (as far as possible) the huge tax evasion; 
-  make the public procurement system more transparent and less corruption-prone; 
-  pursue a monetary policy which is primarily oriented towards macroeconomic stability 
which – after all experience – presupposes an autonomous central bank. 
 
Most of these steps are neutral for the poor or even favour them. But one cannot exclude some 
negative effects. Higher VAT-rates i.e. reduce disproportionately the real income of those 
who have a large consumption-rate and these are the poor. There is another problem. In some 
cases tariffs for public utilities are very low. In Serbia-Montenegro they are “the single largest 
source of quasi-fiscal deficits”
26.  An adjustment to real costs is unavoidable but it would be 
detrimental to the poor. There is no easy escape from this trade-off between macroeconomic 
stabilization (which favours the poor in the long run) and poverty-reduction (which becomes 
more difficult in the short run). What governments can do, is to get as much scope as possible 
for well targeted income subsidies through a strengthened fiscal revenue- and expenditure-
management and to pursue consequently macro-economic stability.  
 
ad c) Competitive markets. -  The engine of growth is private initiative. Time is over in 
which the state was considered the “caretaker” for social welfare. The government still has to 
                                                 
26 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (2001), p. XII.   11
take some regulative responsibilities within the framework of a “strong but limited state”. But 
it is well advised not to intervene into markets for private goods and not to dictate what 
individuals should desire.  
 
On point should be clear. It is so self-evident that it is rarely being mentioned. Private 
initiative to an extent that is necessary to stimulate economic growth is not given forever and 
for all. It can (and sometimes it must) be learned. The same is true for private responsibility 
and the willingness to take risks. Individual mentalities like these are prerequisites for 
growth and they must be trained. This does not mean that everybody has to become a narrow-
minded profit-maximizer. To develop these mentalities means (at least in my opinion which 
may not be shared by every apologist of a market system): individuals should exercise their 
best capabilities in a responsible way; they should work for their economic improvement 
having in mind, that wealth is not the highest value in human life and being economically 
efficient is not synonymous to happiness. Admittedly this sounds a bit idealistic. But a market 
economy will degenerate (or not get started at all) if not a certain number of people will act 
correspondingly: not as ruthless fans of an economic ideology but as responsible men and 
women who develop their best talents oriented towards their own enlightened understanding 
of a better life.  
 
What can politically be done in order to develop private economic initiative? The state can 
provide for the institutions of a market economy. In this setting, everyone can act in 
correspondence to his or her private interests (how enlightened these interests are must be left 
to every individual) and these actions are being made compatible to each other not by an ex 
ante planning-process but ex post as a result of competition. This competition-process offers 
some systemic advantages but it contains specific risks. There is no guarantee that someone 
gains a “just” reward for his economic effort. “Justice” is no concept which fits into the 
institutional design of a market economy as Hayek told us convincingly
27.  
 
Therefore, establishing competitive markets alone will not contribute to a pro-poor growth. It 
must be supplemented – I’ll come back to this point. But the need to complement competitive 
markets should not divert from every effort to establish them. What does this mean for South-
Eastern Europe? Governments of the region still distort private markets in many forms and at 
                                                 
27 Hayek (1976), p. 69; the relationship between “social justice” and the market-system is being discussed in 
Sautter/Schinke (2001).    12
the same time they are delaying necessary regulations which are prerequisites of a market 
system.  
 
To take first the governmental over-activity in a market-distorting way:  
-  an over-complex and non-transparent public administration strangulates many  
      private initiatives;
28 
-    small firms suffer from bureaucratic harassment (frequent inspections, audits  etc.)
29;  
-    SOEs are still privileged against private firms; 
-    price-regulations impede an efficient allocation of scarce resources: 
-    customs procedures are over-complex and impede the modernization of the capital- 
     stock. 
 
On the other side, governments are weak in establishing the institutional preconditions of 
market economy: 
-  the poor law enforcement (in combination with an high corruption) contributes to a  bad  
business climate;   
-  insecure property-rights impede private investments; 
-  the  insufficient protection of creditors is an obstacle for the development of credit 
markets; 
-  poor regulations of financial institutions are one of the causes for the wide-spread 
distrust in these institutions. 
 
The challenges ahead are obvious. Administrative procedures have to be simplified, the 
privatisation of SEOs should be continued (without the preference to insiders over outsiders 
including foreign investors as it was practiced in Croatia
30), property rights have to be 
strengthened, administrative costs of entering markets should be lowered etc. In one word: 





                                                 
28 Until recently in Moldova it took 150 registration steps to get a license for establishing a private enterprise, 
World Bank (2002), p. 9.  
29 World Bank (2003a), p. XX. 
30 World Bank (2001), p. XI   13
2.2. Making the growth-process “pro-poor”      
 
Good governance, macroeconomic stability and competitive markets are good for economic 
growth which benefits the poor as well as the rich. In order to make the process “pro-poor”, 
growth must be focussed on sectors the poor are working in, on regions the poor are living in 
and on factors the poor possess or are able to possess
31. Poverty assessments show that the 
corresponding sector is agriculture, the relevant regions are mainly rural ones and the factor in 
question is labour. Therefore, pro-poor growth should disproportionately favour agricultural 
production, non-agricultural incomes in rural areas, the demand for labour and the   
endowment with of the poor with “human capital”.  
 
In order to substantiate this argument we may look to some statistical data. In Albania 66 
percent of the poorest quintile and 61 percent of the second quintile are rural households. 
Their main source of income (37 %) is small scale agriculture followed by wage employment 
(27 %)
32. Bosnia-Herzegovina shows a similar picture. In spite of a low degree of extreme 
poverty, households in rural areas are especially vulnerable. Moreover, poverty is positively 
correlated with low educational levels, limited access to health services and unemployment 
and it is concentrated among internally displaced people and large families. Among 
households with three and more children below 14, poverty-rate is 56 % or nearly three times 
higher than the average
33.  Unemployment, low education and living in rural areas are also the 
main factors of poverty in Bulgaria. In addition to that there is an ethnical problem. The 
Roma are strongly over-represented among the poorest quintile
34. Pockets of poverty which 
are ethnically determined are also one of the problems of Croatia. Among the poor who 
mainly live in rural areas the non-Croates are over-represented: Serbs, Albanians, Roma and 
Bosnian Muslims
35. In Macedonia two thirds of poor households live in rural areas. Here the 
headcount index is nearly twice as high than in the capital (25% in comparison to 13.9 %
36). 
As well as in Bulgaria poverty among the Roma is disproportionately high. The same is true 
for Romania. Three out of five Roma live in extreme poverty and only one out of 5 Roma is 
not poor
37. Poverty is concentrated in rural areas and among the unemployed; 45 % of the 
unemployed are poor. Also in Moldava poverty is mainly a rural problem. Alarming is the 
                                                 
31 Dreze/Sen (1989); Ravallion/Datt (2002). 
32 World Bank (2003a), p. XIII. 
33 World Bank (2003b), p. III. 
34 World Bank (2004a), p.2. 
35 World Bank (2001), p. VIII. 
36 Government of the Republic of Macedonia (2000), p.2. 
37 World Bank (2003d), p. II.   14
fact that one fifth of the poor are children
38. Serbia-Montenegro also suffers from a high 
poverty in rural areas, among the unemployed and among the poorly educated. To 
summarize: Pro-poor growth should 
 
(a) be focussed on agriculture and on other income-creating activities in rural areas, it should 
(b) increase the demand for labour, it should  
(c) facilitate the formation of the poor’s “human capital”, and it should  
(d) tackle country-specific pockets of poverty.  
 
ad a) Rural development. – Some countries in South-Eastern Europe suffered from the same 
“urban bias” as most developing countries (Lipton, 1977). Policy was made by the cities, in 
the cities and for the cities. Physical infrastructure in rural areas has been neglected, the rural 
population has been discriminated with regard to health and educational services, agriculture 
was taken as a source for financing industrialization and not as a sector which deserves some 
promotion. This distortion has to be corrected. However, one should be cautious and 
distinguish between short-term necessities and long-term prospects. In the short to medium-
term, poverty-reduction will not be possible without productivity-growth in the agricultural 
sector. In the long run, however, economic prospects are not to be found in this sector but in 
manufacturing and in services. Even in case of open markets for agricultural products in an 
enlarged European Union, the future of South-Eastern Europe lies outside agriculture. 
 
This, of course, is no argument for neglecting this sector. On the contrary! Productivity-
growth in agriculture must be stimulated, and what is even more important: off-farm 
employment in rural areas should be promoted
39. There are many possibilities to do this: 
 
-     land-markets can contribute to an efficient allocation of agricultural plots; 
-  extension services may help to introduce labour-intensive technologies; 
-  voluntary cooperative associations can facilitate the introduction of modern technologies; 
-  infrastructure can be improved through the rehabilitation and construction of rural roads, 
bridges etc. which facilitates the access to consumer markets for agricultural products and 
the procurement of inputs; 
                                                 
38 World Bank (2002), p.5. Mitev/Stubbs (2004, p. 49) give an overview on children in absolute and relative 
poverty in all countries of the region.  
39 This point is stressed in: CASE (2004), p. 7.   15
-  quality standards for agricultural products can be improved i.e. through establishing 
institutions for plant health protection and for sanitary services; 
-  micro-credit programs can facilitate farm and off-farm investments
40; 
-  off-farm work in the processing of agricultural products can diversify the sources of 
incomes and increase the purchasing power in rural areas (wine production, processing of 
tobacco, wood processing, canning industry, sugar production etc.); 
-  in some countries there is a high potential for developing tourism. 
 
ad b) Increase of the demand for labour.- In all countries unemployment is strongly 
correlated with poverty. Therefore, the creation of productive employment opportunities is 
one of the main elements of a strategy for pro-poor growth. These opportunities result from 
private economic activities so that all efforts to improve the business climate also contribute 
to a higher employment.  
 
But this is not enough. The demand for labour can be increased disproportionately through the 
introduction of labour-intensive technologies. They can be promoted through tax-incentives 
(or at least through the avoidance of tax-disincentives in form of tax-brakes and subsidies for 
capital-intensive technologies). Micro-credit programs and corresponding guarantee funds for 
Small Scale Enterprises (SME) are another form of employment creation as SMEs in general 
are more labour-intensive than big firms.  
 
In this context, the institutional design of labour markets is of special importance. Rigid 
regulations which protect job owners against job-seekers, a low degree of wage flexibility and 
open discrimination
41 are deficiencies which characterize the labour markets in many 
countries. Reforms, therefore, are indispensable. They have to be oriented towards a higher 
flexibility of wages, the elimination of all forms of discrimination (gender-discrimination, 
ethnic discrimination), an improved matching process, lower payroll taxes
42 etc. The 
elimination of unnecessary regulations also facilitates the transition from informal to formal 
employment with its higher potential for productivity-increases. 
 
                                                 
40 One should not over-emphasize these programs. By and large they benefit not directly the poorest sections of 
rural population, the landless and those farmers with very small plots. Nevertheless, productivity increases 
induced by micro-credit programs create an additional demand for labour-intensive services which may be 
offered by the poor.   
41 This is a special problem in Croatia; World Bank (2001), p. XIII. 
42 In Romania unusually high payroll taxes at 52 percent of gross wages are partly responsible for high 
unemployment rates; World Bank (2003d), p. IV.     16
Romania made some experience with active labour market policies: the programs for 
training and retraining (TR), small business consultancy and assistance (SB), employment and 
relocation (ER) and public works community job creation. (PW). The experience was mixed. 
The first three of these programs had positive employment effects, SB and ER also influenced 
positively the monthly earnings of participants, whereas PW could not be considered as 
successful. This is not astonishing in view of the experiences of other countries. The 
conclusion which can be drawn from the Romanian results seems to be, that initiatives for 
training and retraining as well as those for consultancy and assistance are the most promising 
ones
43. They are not only oriented towards the demand side of labour markets, but also (and 
primarily) towards the supply side. This is also the focus of programs for human capital-
formation.  
 
ad c) Initiatives to improve the “human capital” of the poor. – Poverty assessments for all 
countries of the region show, that poverty is strongly correlated to a low level of education 
and to a bad state of health. The relevant causalities are double-sided. An unfinished primary 
education and the missing access to health services are causes of poverty, and poor people 
cannot afford to pay for a better education and better health services. Circular causalities like 
this are being passed to the next generation. Poverty, therefore, becomes a chronic 
phenomenon. In Romania i.e. 39% of children aged 15-24 living in poor households are not in 
school and did not attend vocational or high school; this compares to 10% for non-poor 
children of the same age group
44. This makes it even more important to invest into the human 
capital of the poor. In general, better educated adults earn more, they have better chances to 




The political priorities do not correspond to the importance of human capital formation. In 
Albania i.e. public spending on education has fallen to levels almost half of what it was in 
                                                 
43 World Bank (2003d), p.40.  
44 op. cit., p. III. 
45 There are exceptions. In Moldova, for example, among the poor are highly educated persons who once (before 
transformation began) “enjoyed socially prestigious and well compensated positions as scientists and 
professionals” (World Bank, 2002, p. 5). These are unsolved problems of the transformation process. The 
existence of highly educated poor people is no argument against a better education for the poor. It merely shows 
that education cannot be isolated from the macroeconomic and political environment. If growth rates are 
negative and public as well as private expenditures for scientific purposes decline, a highly specialized 
knowledge may not protect from poverty. But in an environment of high growth rates, increasing public 
revenues and expenditures and functioning scientific institutions, to be well educated is the best precondition to 
get a well-paid job. In Romania, for example, “post-secondary and higher education of household head almost 
were fully absent from the poverty figures”, CASE (2004), p. 7.        17
1990
46. In Moldova it declined from 10% of GDP in 1997 to 4.5% in 2000
47. In these as in 
other countries enrolment rates went down, drop out rates increased (especially at the 
secondary school level), curricula are out of date and do not correspond to the requirements of 
a modern market economy. In one word: It seems that exactly those investments have been 
seriously neglected which are decisive not only within a strategy of poverty reduction but 
also within a strategy for economic growth in general
48. 
 
The importance, therefore, of a new education policy cannot be overstressed. It should include 
the following elements: 
 
-  Availability of pre-school education for poor children who need it most to offset their 
relatively deprived background; 
-  review of curriculum standards; 
-  reform of the curricula of secondary  and  professional schools in view of the 
requirements of the labour market; 
-  establishment of a participatory education system through the creation of social 
partnership mechanisms involving the family, the school and the local community; 
-  scholarship programs for talented poor children; 
-  development of out-of-school training; 
-  lower barriers for the establishment of private schools; 
-  better school-equipment, especially in rural areas, better systems of teacher-training and 
an attractive payment for teachers. 
 
The other element of a human capital-strategy is health policy. Individual health and 
education standards are strongly connected: Healthy children usually show better results at 
school and high levels of education usually go hand in hand with illness-preventing hygienic- 
and nutrition-standards. Therefore, health- and education policies should not be separated: the 
success on one field decides upon the success on the other one. 
 
The main problem is the limited access of the poor to health services. Usually health stations, 
hospitals, medical doctors etc. are concentrated in the cities and not in rural areas where the 
                                                 
46 World Bank (2003a), p. XVI. 
47 World Bank (2002), p. 12. 
48 Growth of any variety is higher in countries with sufficient human capital; Barro (1991); 
Mankiw/Roemer/Weil (1992).    18
majority of poor people live. Moreover, in many cases medical costs are prohibitively high. 
The consequence is a poverty-trap: The poor suffer from a bad state of health, therefore their 
earning capacity is limited and this makes it impossible for them to overcome their poverty. In 
addition to that, underdeveloped and non-accessible health services make those people very 
vulnerable, who earn just a bit more than the minimum income. If they fall ill, their risk is 
very high to sink below the poverty-line. 
 
The main challenge, therefore, is to improve the access to qualitatively high health services 
for the poor. It can be done, for example, by 
 
-  establishing a mandatory health insurance system (which is compatible with 
competition between various insurance companies); 
-  establishing and upgrading of rural dispensaries, maternity units etc.; 
-  the  hygienic education of poor families including issues of family planning (poor 
families in general are large families); 
-  new priorities for health ministries (which until now focussed their activities to the 
middle- and upper class and to urban areas).   
 
ad d) Initiatives to tackle the pockets of poverty. 
 
Obviously, this is the most difficult task in every strategy for pro-poor growth. In some areas 
and among certain ethnic groups, poverty in its extreme forms has been chronic for many 
generations. Take for example the Roma who constitute a substantial part of the population in 
Bulgaria (8.9%), Romania (9.4%) and Macedonia (10.9%)
49. Other examples are some remote 
rural areas in Albania, Romania amd Bulgaria. It would be an illusion to eliminate these 
pockets of poverty within on generation. But also these forms of chronic pauperization can be 
alleviated. One thing should be clear, though: Competitive markets alone cannot solve the 
problem. Governmental initiatives are indispensable – if it is a political goal at all to tackle 
these poverty-niches. 
 
Principally, all measures  described above can alleviate this form of poverty if they are 
focussed  on the pockets in question: improved health services, better access to schools, 
agricultural extension services, infrastructure investments, off-farm employment etc. in 
                                                 
49 Mitev/Stubb (2004), p. 65.   19
remote rural areas and in favour of ethnic groups living in extreme forms of poverty. A 
precondition is the elimination of all forms of ethnic discriminations and of a deeply-rooted 
“urban bias”. It is not sufficient to change some laws. Mentalities, ways of thinking and 
attitudes have to be changed, too, and this takes much more time than passing new laws. 
 
In view of existing discriminations one should avoid any further marginalization of poor 
ethnic groups. It could undesirably result from a targeting process along ethnic boundaries. 
Therefore, it may be advisable to target poverty-alleviation measures to “communities where 
Roma are over-represented rather than singling out Roma explicitly”
50. This point was made 
in view of Romania. It indicates how delicate it is to tackle pockets of poverty without stirring 
up the resistance of the non-poor. 
 
Another point deserves to be mentioned. For some rural areas, migration to other regions 
may be the only realistic way to solve the problem. Take the mountain-region of Albania as 
an example. The average land size owned by a household is around 0.72 hectares. In addition 
to that, climatic and geographical conditions are very hard which makes it difficult to increase 
agricultural productivity in a substantial way.
51 Possibly the poverty of people still living 
there can only be eliminated if these people migrate. Already now in this country “migration 
is perhaps the single most important political, social and economic phenomena”
52.   
 
       3. Conclusions   
 
The considerations in section 2 suggest the following conclusions: 
 
First, pro-poor growth cannot be expected from a development which is governed by 
competitive markets alone. In a market economy which works within the framework of some 
kind of “minimal state”, the poor will benefit disproportionately less from growth and 
distributional inequality will increase. In other words: growth will be “pro-rich” as it was 
within the past 10 years in all countries of the region. 
 
Second, to get a disproportionate higher benefit from economic growth to the poor, it needs a 
bundle of well-targeted political measures. They have to include specific programs for rural 
                                                 
50 World Bank (2003d), p. II. 
51 World Bank (2003a), p. XIII. 
52 op. cit. p. XVIII.   20
development, for the stimulation of small and medium-sized enterprises, for employment-
generation and for a better access of the poor to education and health-services.  
 
Third, these measures have to be planned and executed in a consistent way without 
undermining the conditions of overall economic growth. In most cases this should be possible, 
at least on a theoretical level. Measures to improve the education and the health of poor 
people and to increase their labour-productivity automatically stimulate overall growth. 
Insofar, these measures constitute a “win-win”-constellation. Nevertheless, there are trade-
off-situations. Some measures which favour the poor may undermine macro-economic 
stability and the efficiency of resource-allocation (i.e. price-regulations and subsidies for 
public utilities). From an economic point of view, it is desirable not to intervene into the 
price-mechanism and to materialize social goals through fiscal instruments. But the best 
policy from an economic point of view may not be practicable. In these cases, politicians have 
to balance between a long-term and a more short-term poverty-alleviation. In the long run, a 
stable and efficient economic system without price-distorting subsidies offers good conditions 
for poverty-alleviation, but eliminating these subsidies may be detrimental to the poor in the 
short run.  
 
Fourth, a well-designed strategy for pro-poor growth depends on the decisiveness of 
politicians as well as on the capabilities of public administration. It is hard to imagine, that a 
strategy like this will be materialized without giving the poor “voice” to influence the 
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24Table 2: Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores, Civil Liberties
Year covered 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Albania 6 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 3
Bosnia-Herzegovina .. .. 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
Bulgaria 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
Croatia .. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 2 2
Macedonia .. .. 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 3
Moldova .. 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Romania 5 5 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Serbia and Montenegro 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 3 2 2
Source: Freedom House (2004)
For Yugoslavia, ratings from 199 to 2002 were for the country that remained following the departures between 1991 and 
1992 of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In February 2003, the Yugoslav parliament adopted a 
constitutional charter establishing the state of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, beginning in 2003, Yugoslavia is listed as 
"Serbia and Montenegro."
Civil liberties are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the 
lowest.
25Table 3: Corruption Perception Index (CPI)      
 
Country 
Rank           
(133 countries)  CPI 2003  score  
Bulgaria  54  3.9   





Romania  83  2.8   
Albania  92 2.5   
Moldova  100  2.4   




2.3   
     
Source: Transparency International (2004)   
    
CPI 2003 Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk 
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).   
 
26Table 4: Inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %) 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Albania -0,469 34,54 249,7 114,8 37,02 9,839 28,42 11,75 12,45 6,507 -4,085 3,891 6,035
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 8,847 -17,06 8,553 6,913 3,842 5,792 9,115 2,113
Bulgaria 26,19 226,6 59,59 51,08 72,67 62,85 120,8 948,5 23,67 3,722 6,691 6,711 3,859
Croatia 99,33 594,9 1467 111,8 5,315 3,642 7,36 8,404 3,783 4,735 2,932 2,919
Macedonia, 
FYR 78,98 1272 442,1 151,9 17,09 2,865 3,971 1,37 2,759 8,178 3,611 3,584
Moldova 142,8 945 860,5 276,4 38,74 27,85 12,5 9,462 39,78 27,33 11,93 8,1
Romania 13,6 194,9 200,1 227,4 138,9 35,24 45,17 147,3 55,22 47,77 46,41 37,91 24,22
Serbia and 
Montenegro 69,01 32,39 34,24 60,94 88,28 91,66 25,47
Source: World Bank (2004)
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price change in the economy as a 
whole. The GDP implicit deflator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency.
27Figure 1: GDP Growth (annual %)


















28Figure 2: Inflation, GDP Deflator (annual %) 
Source: World Bank (2004)
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